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In this article, I raise a question and acknowledge a feminist debt. The ‘feminist debt’ 
is to the politics of location, and the question asks: what particular stipulations and 
enablements does a critical reflexive feminist politics of location put in place for doing 
feminist theory? I suggest that there are at least three stipulations/ enablements that 
a critical reflexive feminist politics of location puts in place for knowledge production.  
Firstly, a politics of location demands/enables accounts of knowledge production 
which reveal the entanglements of power relations that underpin it and highlight the 
politics of struggle that underwrite it. Secondly, a critical politics of location 
demands/enables conceptual work in different geographical spaces—and in 
particular, it facilitates conceptual work in non-standard background contexts and 
conditions. And finally, a critical politics of location demands/enables a 
methodological response to capture the different conceptual and analytical and 
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In this article, I raise a question and acknowledge a feminist debt. The ‘feminist debt’ 
is to a critical reflexive politics of location, and the question asks: What  particular 
stipulations and enablements does a critical reflexive feminist politics of location put 
in place for doing feminist theory?  And, furthermore, what does it mean for doing 
feminist theory from the global south? Through invoking the metaphor of a feminist 
debt, I acknowledge the work that a critical reflexive feminist politics of location does, 
and in particular, of rendering the very ‘thinkability’ (Trouillot 1995) and intellectual 
possibility of producing knowledge from different locations. Now, to centre location 
and to think with the global south, is to already establish two things right away: it is to 
flag the ‘provincial’ location of all theory and also to signal the specific context of 
unremitting power relations that inform theoretical and representational endeavours 
(Said 1978): the imperial, colonial entanglements of epistemologies with 
contemporary global geographies, prevailing political economies (Cusiqanqui 2012), 
and the transnational circuits of power through which knowledges travel and assume 
authority (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Mohanty 1995, Alexander and Mohanty 2010). In 
recent years, scholars have drawn attention to the ‘planetary imperialising expansion 
of global coloniality’ (Wynter in McKittrick 2015) and to the institutional power of the 
‘epistemologies of ignorance’ (Mills 2007) and forms of ‘colonial unknowing’, 
(Vimalassery et al 2016; Stoler 2011, Lugones 2010 ) that drive, sustain and reproduce 
the coloniality of knowledge production. A key concern in many of these debates is to 
do with the  location of knowledge production itself, with some scholars explicitly 
bringing their location in the ‘colonial present’ under epistemic and ethical scrutiny to 
ask: ‘how do we understand our locations in the colonial present, as we contemplate 
and work towards the imperative of decolonization’ (Vimalassery 2016:1)?  While 
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others are calling for a re-location of theory building to and from the global south’ 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, Connell 2014) and the ‘third world’ (Mignolo 2018). I 
acknowledge these important and crucial interventions on ‘doing theory from the 
global south’ but also suggest that the problem however, lies not so much at the level 
of theory production, for that simply reflects on the patterns that one looks at and 
assumes but  at the level of concepts. In other words, it is not so much the lack of 
diversity in theory production that is the problem but the lack of diversity of 
conceptual production which is the key difficulty. For quite simply, there are not 
enough concepts in place to capture but also produce theorised accounts of different, 
historically specific and located forms of worldmaking in ‘most of the world’. 
 
Many feminist scholars have written influentially about location as a place in space 
and in time but also  in history and epistemology. They have invoked location to draw 
attention to unequal distribution of intellectual and institutional capital and 
production of knowledge around the globe but also to the entanglements of theory 
building with the heteropatriarchal, racist, capitalist geopolitics and power relations 
that structure and inform knowledge production (Cusiqanqui 2012; Rich 1986; 
Mohanty 1995, 1991; Smith 1999; Wynter 2003).Questioning the location of 
knowledge production is, of course, hardly confined to certain strands feminist 
thinking alone. Within wider scholarship, location has been used to draw attention 
to the interstitial and ‘in between spaces’ where differences are negotiated (Bhabha 
1994), to the ‘provincialism’ of the universalist pretensions of thought (Chakrabarty 
2000), to ‘place consciousness’ (Dirlik 1999)  and to the historicity of concepts 
(Hacking 2002). More recently, location has come  inform ‘border thinking’ espoused 
by the decolonial scholars ( Mignolo 2011). However, what is perhaps, unique to 
feminist scholarship on location is its insistence on location as a critical reflexive 
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ethics. This critical reflexive ethics comes into two forms: the first helps register and 
document  the global power relations that underpin the production of knowledge and 
privilege particular sites of knowledge production and dissemination. It insists that 
the theorist declare their location and position within  the global circuits of 
intellectual division of labour ( Spivak 1987)  and account for the epistemic tracks of 
their location upon their theorising. In other words, a critical reflexive politics of 
location demands an answer to the question:  from where are you looking, and 
whom/what are you seeing? And, the second, forges a dynamic ethical relationship  
‘between the self and the collective…a relation to the self that is constantly made and 
remade depending on the location of self in specific contexts of struggle’ (Mohanty 
1995), but also redraws the  ethical relationship  of the self or selves to the site(s) of 
knowledge production. Acknowledging a feminist debt is one such ethical redrawing 
of a relationship, that between the self and the institutional  production of knowledge. 
Here, acknowledging a feminist debt, is to actively interrupt the neoliberal politics of 
knowledge production and its exalted ethic of individuation, ruthless 
competitiveness and general intellectual disinterestedness and lack of reflexivity on 
one’s complicity and implication in upholding and reproducing the material 
structures of epistemic inequality and injustice. At this point you might say to me, 
well, why feminist debt, though? And, what about citational practices? Are they not 
the primary form in which  acknowledgement works in the academy? And, you’d of 
course be right; well, at least, for most part. To be sure, citational practice is certainly 
one form of acknowledgment of course, but a  feminist debt that I have in mind goes 
beyond citation. While a citation brings scholars into existence (Ahmed 2013), a 
feminist debt on the other hand is an acknowledgment of the possibility of doing 
particular research in the first instance; it is an acknowledgement of the intellectual, 
institutional and political practices and interventions that makes particular kinds of 
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knowledge production possible. Critically, however, it is to do with the ‘thinkability’ 
of particular knowledges and of their being counted as knowledge. A feminist debt 
cannot be repaid. But to acknowledge one’s feminist debts is to acknowledge a 
responsibility and an ethics, where ethics is not limited to knowledge making but 
involves a call to responsibility: a responsibility to (re)produce conditions of 
thinkability and also possibilities of/for different knowledges.  
 
A feminist debt to a critical politics of location, however, not only demands a 
responsibility to produce conditions of ‘thinkability’ but also institutes certain 
demands and constraints on how one produces theory and knowledges. These 
demands and constraints require: asking different questions, naming the epistemic 
ground one speaks/writes from, of refusing a technical application of theory, while 
insisting on ‘speaking back to it’ and of working to/ for justice: i.e. to work towards 
shifting the epistemic centre of knowledge production. But, what in effect do these 
stipulations put in place by a politics of location actually mean on how knowledges are 
produced, not least from the global south? Well, there are at least three concrete ways 
in which these stipulations bear on knowledge production.  Firstly, a politics of 
location demands/enables an account of knowledge production that draws attention 
to the entanglements of power relations that underpin knowledge production and 
highlights the  politics of struggle, that underwrites it. Secondly, a critical politics of 
location demands/enables the production of conceptual work in different geographical 
spaces—and in particular, it facilitates conceptual work in non-standard background 
contexts and conditions. And finally, and relatedly, a critical politics of location 
demands/enables a methodological response to capture the different conceptual and 
analytical and empirical knowledges produced in different locations.  
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In acknowledging its feminist debt, this article refuses the relentless theoretical 
incitement to identify limitations of existing frameworks, and in this case, those of the 
politics of location. Instead, it highlights and extends the generative and productive 
epistemological and methodological interventions that a critical reflexive politics of 
location enables.  In what follows, I will elaborate on the three extensions or 
demands/enablements instituted by a critical reflexive politics of location through a 
discussion on how these enable thinking about questions of agency, rights and human 
rights, both of course, key questions that animate feminist theory and politics. In 
particular, these enablements/constraints insist that questions of agency and human 
rights are relational and contextual in nature and therefore require specific conceptual 
descriptions  of their complex articulations in different locations. By demanding an 
epistemic accounting of the specific historical specificities of the politics of agency and 
that of rights and human rights, a critical reflexive politics of location calls for radically 
shifting the standard background contexts that informs theory building and for 
curating, assembling and documenting different registers, imaginaries and 
possibilities for thinking otherwise. To identify and envision different epistemic 
registers and possibilities is to go beyond recognising and documenting the prevailing 
forms of eurocentrism and subjectivities. It is to focus on generating intellectual 
resources embedded in materially and intersectionally informed concepts arising from 
historically specific locations and encounters in the world, including on the different 
modalities of agency and the particular  stakes and struggles that animate the politics 
of rights in the global south. 
 
 
Location of/as Struggle 
 
	 7	
For some years now,  I have been somewhat insistent to tell a different story of rights 
and human rights. I tell a story located in contemporary struggles of subaltern groups 
in rural India and Pakistan. My starting point is to ask:  What different stories of 
human rights would we tell if we produced human rights scholarship from the 
standpoint of the stakes and the struggles of subaltern groups at the frontline of 
human rights mobilisations in ‘most of the world’? The subaltern struggles I study tie 
rights firmly to gendered struggles for socio-economic, political, epistemic and 
ontological justice. They interrupt state centric but also well rehearsed originary 
stories of temporalities, global institutional histories and abstract subjectivities, which 
are the staple of global human rights discourse, to generate historically specific 
discourses of rights replete with their own languages of claim making, subjectification, 
and worldmaking. Their stories of rights and human rights highlight intersectional, 
gendered and interdependent content of rights firmly tied to economic redistributive 
justice, and open up not only a different epistemic terrain for rights talk but also 
register their epistemic presence in the face of wilful ignorance and epistemic erasure. 
This epistemic erasure is mostly maintained and kept in place through a lack of 
theoretical, conceptual and philosophical scholarship on the different normative 
languages and political anxieties animating rights struggles in different parts of the 
globe. Driving the scholarship on global human rights is an inordinate preoccupation 
with the politics of origins, which stipulates that human rights originate, belong, travel 
from and operate for the west. This politics of origins is shared by both celebrators and 
detractors of human rights and is not without effects. In the hand of the detractors, it 
places a politically expedient argument to delegitimise modes of protest and 
questioning of excessive state power on the basis that human rights are illegitimate 
and foreign and therefore with little traction and legitimacy. In critical/progressive 
scholarship on human rights, this originary story shores up the  ‘West’ as the epistemic 
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subject of human rights,  although this time via critique and through displaying wilful 
ignorance and historical amnesia around rights struggles in most of the world. At stake 
therefore, in displacing the politics of origins lie questions of epistemic authority, 
agency and democratic politics. 
Struggles over epistemic authority are of course, neither  new nor novel questions in 
feminist scholarship. Feminist epistemologists have insisted on asking not only who is 
and can be the knower, but also what can be known, about what, and from which 
locations. They’ve unmasked, decentred and located the  figure of the ‘all seeing and 
all representing universal knower’ and challenged the Archimedian position long held 
as the privileged location of theory building, and in so doing, identified the 
contradictory assumptions that underpin epistemological thinking. For instance, 
philosophical thinking not only presupposes only particularly located persons as 
knowers (Code 2012) but also presupposes these particularly located knowers are also 
located nowhere! Parsing through these contradictions, feminist epistemologists have 
unmasked the identity of the knower and located the knower in particular social and 
historical milieus, demonstrating thereby, not only the political and ontological 
entanglements of knowledge production (Alcoff 1993, 1991) but also the 
methodological individualism and the assumptions of ‘human homogeneity’ that 
underpin epistemological enquiry. Adrienne Rich, the feminist poet and author titled 
her essay, ‘notes on the politics of location’ and catapulted struggles over 
accountability, responsibility and ethical politics to the centre stage of feminist 
knowledge production. Exhorting white feminists to examine the ‘thoughtlessly white’ 
assumptions underpinning their feminism, Rich directs her ire at the deadly 
‘sameness’ of abstraction that ‘allows no differences among places, times, cultures, 
conditions, movements’ (1981:221). As opposed to this ahistorical, ‘lofty and 
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privileged’ abstract theorising which centres white women and engenders a ‘confusion 
between [our] claims to the white Western eye and the woman-seeing eye’ (1981: 219), 
Rich demands that we recognise the location and ‘name the ground  we are coming 
from and the conditions we have taken for granted…’ (219). As is well known, a 
significant effect of this refusal to locate oneself in the geopolitics of theory production 
has been the prolific circulation of the universalising representational manoeuvres 
that produce visions of ‘global sisterhood’ while erasing power differentials of race, 
class, caste, sexuality and geopolitical location (Mohanty 1996; Grewal and Kaplan 
1994). As opposed to this feminist politics of ‘global transcendence’ and its denial of 
global power relations, Chandra Mohanty  calls  for a feminist politics of engagement 
that is located in the ‘temporality of struggles’ and draws on ‘historically interpreted 
and theorised’ experiences of differently located and ongoing struggles over what it 
means to experience gender/gender oppressions in different locations (1996:122). It 
is this centrality of and complicity within crisscrossing and dynamic entanglements of 
power structures and relations across different locations and their implications for 
knowledge production that distinguishes transnational feminist scholarship and 
practices from global and international feminisms (Mohanty 1995: Grewal and Kaplan 
1994;  Alexander and Mohanty 2010; Swarr and Nagar 2010). This focus on uneven 
and unequal entanglements of power relations dispels any attachment to  location as 
signifying difference for difference sake. If anything, invoking location as power 
saturated and as signifying ‘specific relations of domination and subordination’ 
institutes a meaningful corrective to the easy slip slide into ‘neo relativism’, where 
difference and multiplicity are celebrated without any recognition of the fields of 
power in which difference and sameness operate and invoked (Frankenberg and Mani 
1993). But what might be the implications for knowledge production of taking into 
account unequal historical, geographical, political and institutional locations? In their 
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introduction to an important edited volume, Richa Nagar and Amanda Lock Swarr 
(2010) argue that taking entangled global locations seriously can result in refusing 
individualist modes of academic knowledge production by ‘reclaiming collaborative 
praxis’ as a keystone of transnational feminist scholarship and practice. Reconceiving 
collaboration as an ‘ intellectual and political tool’ can ‘consciously combine struggles 
for socio-political justice with feminist research methodologies’ (2010:13), and thus, 
bridging the gap between those ‘theorising the complexities of knowledge production 
across borders and those concerned with imagining concrete ways to enact solidarities 
across nations, institutions, socio-political identifications, and economic categories 
and materialities’ (2010: 2). Vigilance and hyper reflexivity is key here ( Spivak 1999; 
Bjokert-Thapar and Henry 2004; Kapoor 2007), and it is critical that these 
collaborative exercises do not become yet another occasion for ‘reproducing colonial 
power relations’ all over again, and as Farhana Sultana ( 2019:36) cautions, scholars 
need to be reflexive on how their locations in global imperialist logics can potentially 
threaten best intentions. 
 
But even as feminist scholars continue to challenge epistemology’s ‘irrepressible 
connection with social power’ (Fricker 2007:2) and critique the epistemic exclusions 
that have denied (white) women a place at the epistemology table,  questions of who, 
where and what possesses epistemic authority within feminist theory itself refuse to 
die down. And, while struggles over what counts as feminist theory and who can be a 
feminist theorist have been remarkably  generative and productive in challenging the 
internal colonialism of feminist theory, opening up  new intellectual  directions and 
forging new conceptual and theoretical tools steeped in different realities and 
locations, these have done little to address the steep inequalities and coloniality that 
characterise the transnational institutional and political economies of knowledge 
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production (Cusiqanqui 2012, Boni 2017, Medie and Kang 2018, Mama 2007).   It is 
striking of course, that a disproportionally large volumes of scholarship including by 
feminist scholars of colour, are produced by those located in the global north. Quite 
simply this scandalous state of affairs exists not only because struggles for epistemic 
authority have yet to be heard seriously enough but also because the operation of 
‘epistemologies of ignorance’ and those of ‘colonial unknowing’ together with the vice 
grip of positivist knowledge production has meant that the coloniality of knowledge 
systems and their geo-political, and institutional entanglements have remained largely 
invisible but also unspeakable. Consequently, the key question demanded by a critical  
reflexive feminist politics of location: from where are you looking, and whom and what 
are you seeing? is  often, resolutely refused.  
 
A key site where contestations over geopolitical location, civilizational and 
representational politics and white saviour complex converge to overdetermine but 
also characterise great swathes of feminist thinking is over the status of agency, 
autonomy and rights/human rights in feminist scholarship and politics. If anything, 
feminist thinking on autonomy and agency and also human rights is heavily complicit 
in the transnational politics of judgmentalism, which has been so prolific in 
pronouncing on the quality, degree and nature of agency and also rights enjoyed by 
women in the ‘third world’ . Within various strands of  feminist scholarship, the  fierce, 
lively, fractious and contentious debates on the status of agency and autonomy within 
feminist theory and politics have very often than not pivoted on a set of paradoxical 
attachments. On the one hand, these critique hyper individualist masculinist, 
universalist, ahistorical, acontextual autonomous persons, while on the other, validate 
an enduring attachment to liberal ideas of agency and freedom and in particular, to a 
heroic agent capable of challenging/resisting power relations and embodying a global 
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feminist emancipatory  politics. Unsurprisingly, these paradoxical attachments have 
meant that feminist theorising of agency has been mired in epistemic erasures and 
civilizational and representational dilemmas, traps and misdescriptions (Mohanty 
1991, Spivak 1987, Chow 2003 , Mahmood 2005, Madhok 2013, Abu Lughod 2013). 
However, such is the entrenched epistemic hold and cultural attachment to autonomy 
as an ideal of personhood, that it is has been so hard to shift intellectual perspectives 
and also the political expectations that are so tightly woven around the idea. Things 
are not much different in the arena of global human rights either, where critical 
progressive scholarship has, and as I noted earlier, resulted in shoring up and 
reproducing Europe as the subject, albeit, via progressive critique.  These 
contradictory and paradoxical response to agency and also to rights/human rights  in 
some ways reflects the double sidedness and the  familiar push and the pull of the work 
that characterises their operation on the ground: the enchantments and the 
disappointments; the enablements but also regulatory effects; their mobilisational 
power and democratic potential but also their civilizationalism; the unremitting 
northern pressure behind their power but also their take up by the powerless and the 
precarious across the global north and south; and, their politically conservative effects 
but also the ‘insurgent imaginaries’ (Natera 2013) they produce in their wake that 
exceed existing terms of recognition/inclusion/justice and rights. 
 
Acknowledging  the double edged nature of the work agency and rights do in upholding 
civilizational and epistemic hierarches while also recognizing their indispensability for 
critiquing precisely what reproduce has led many scholars to argue for a need to 
rethink and reconceptualise and retool agency and rights. What is at stake in these 
efforts to reconceptualise agency is this: that ‘misdescriptions’ of women’s agency in 
the global south will continue  until we do not reorient concepts to reflect the critical 
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politics of location of their articulation and deployment (Madhok 2013).  And, it is this 
commitment to a critical politics of location that can be discerned when Saba 
Mahmood argues that “ we should keep the meaning of agency open and allow it to 
emerge from “within language and institutional contexts which make possible of 
relating to certain people, oneself and things’ (2005:15).  Or when Lila Abu Lughod     
(2010) advocates for an ethnographic study the ‘active social life of Muslim women’s 
rights’. In my earlier work, I have queried the spatial geographies and intellectual 
contexts that operate as the standard background contexts for theorising autonomy 
and agency. I argued that negative freedom is the unquestioned standard background 
context for theorising agency and autonomy and that the  governing measure of agency 
and autonomy privileges free action. The former institutes the latter together by  
shoring up the  heroic unbounded white onto epistemic subject able to operationalise 
without exception this governing action bias. However, even a cursory regard for the 
realties of people’s lives show that lives and living are constrained in all manner of 
ways, and that agency thinking cannot continue to regard conditions of negative 
freedom as ‘standard’, a necessary given and, to insist that persons display their 
agentic selves through their ability to commit maximal free action in all circumstances. 
Therefore, conceiving agency of persons outside of imaginaries of full and complete 
negative freedom requires loosening agency’s reliance on negative freedom and its  
inherent action bias but also displacing the principal site of recognition and analysis 
of agency.  
 
II The Location of Concepts 
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Refusing action bias in conceptual descriptions of agency becomes thinkable because 
of a critical politics of location. As an epistemic intervention, location  signifies the 
role of place in knowledge production, and as a generative site ( McKittrick 2011) in 
which concepts and persons come into being (Hacking 2002). Concepts are the 
‘building blocks’ of theory and make our world ‘visualisable and discussable’ 
(Rabinow  2011: 122) and, therefore, the work of theory building requires concepts 
able to capture different  encounters with the world in different locations. 
Furthermore,  not only is there a need for concepts to describe and visualise different 
life-worlds but also for these different conceptual descriptions to intervene in and 
disrupt the normal and ordinary work of theory production that carries on 
thoughtlessly and wilfully ignorant of different life-worlds and their conceptual 
architectures. To put it differently, the problem in producing ‘theories’ for most of the 
world, is that concepts that are put to use in producing theoretical descriptions of the 
world are ‘provincial’ (Chakrabarty 2000) and reflect particular temporal, spatial, 
social and historical contexts. And, therefore, an important way to interrupt the 
pervasive epistemic violence is not simply only to refuse to misrecognise 
provincialism for universalism and refuse to know the world only through 
unidirectional translation. It is also to insist on directing efforts towards producing a 
wider array of conceptual descriptions. Critiques though hugely useful and significant 
demystifying the constellations of power and their entanglements must only be the 
starting point for the production of new intellectual and conceptual histories, 
geographies and epistemologies from different locations. 
 
It bears worth repeating that the production of concepts from most of the world is a 
matter of urgency. But how to study concepts in ‘most of the world’ without either 
falling into the trap of violent commensurability (Tuck and Yang 2012) or radical 
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unintelligibility? The first trap of forced and violent commensurabilty leads to 
theoretical and conceptual misdescriptions, and the latter, down the poisonous hole 
of cultural relativism. Both traps refuse meaningful and careful theoretical 
engagement and shut down conversations. This urgency of studying concepts has 
informed my own work on theorising agency and coercion in non-standard 
background contexts  but also how to conceptually capture the politics of rights and 
human rights outside the Anglo-American, European worlds. And, it is in thinking 
about these questions that I recognised the crucial work that a  critical reflexive  
feminist politics of location does in making it ‘thinkable’ to do conceptual work in  
‘non standard’ locations and contexts, i.e. contexts outside those of which concepts 
are standardly produced, described and visualised. 
 
Important strands of feminist scholarship is admirably attentive to the coming into 
being of concepts at particular locations. Consider for instance how the emergence of 
certain conceptual categories within feminist theory challenge not only the 
epistemological privilege of unmarked, androcentric whiteness masquerading as 
unencumbered, placeless, disembodied knowledges but also provide alternative 
methodologies for knowledge production. Many of the key feminist conceptual 
categories that we have become accustomed to deploying in everyday theorising, 
empirical and in policy work  emerge out of critical engagements with location of 
particular subjects. So, for instance, Kimberlé Crenshaw coins the term 
‘intersectionality’ to visualise and describe the invisibility and erasure of the black 
women located at intersectional locations of hierarchy and oppressions. The political 
and intellectual roots of intersectional thinking run deep in black feminist thinking 
(Collins and Bilge 2016; Nash 2018) however, significantly, and this is crucial, 
intersectionality comes forth from a place that is a ‘non-standard’ background context 
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for conceptual/theory building. After all, how often does one come across or deploys 
concepts that do not emerge and in turn reflect hegemonic and privileged raced and 
classed world views and histories? Another feminist conceptual intervention premised 
on the epistemic authority of marginalised subjects whose ‘shared histories based on 
shared location’ within existing hierarchical power relations (Hartsock 1983, Harding 
1987, Hill Collins 1997:376) is, of course, feminist standpoint theorising. Standpoint 
thinking itself has been a hugely productive site for a  range of important conceptual 
interventions. Sandra Harding has argued for ‘starting off thought from marginalised 
lives’ (1993: 56) and for the necessity of ‘strong objectivity’ for critically evaluating 
which social situations tend to generate the most objective claims, and Donna 
Haraway has written of ‘situated knowledges’, arguing powerfully that feminist 
objectivity’ or ‘situated knowledges’ was “about limited location and enabling  “us to 
become answerable for what we learn how to see” (1988: 583). Haraway cautions 
against a single feminist standpoint arguing that a politics of location is ‘insatiably 
curious about the webs of differential positioning’ and resists the politics of fixation, 
finality and closures to embrace ‘vulnerability’ (1988: 590). Also insisting on specific 
and different feminist standpoints, Patricia Hill Collins writes of a black feminist 
standpoint as a ‘subjugated knowledge’ located in a context of racialised and gendered 
economic and political domination that emerges from an ‘interdependence’ of the 
everyday knowledges of Black African American women and ‘the more specialised 
knowledge of Black women intellectuals’ (2000:269).  And,  Sharmila Rege (1998) 
writes of Dalit feminist standpoint that derives from and is located in Dalit women’s 
struggles but crucially, does not originate from an authentic well of Dalit women’s 
difference or experience. As opposed to the politics of authenticity, Rege argues that a 
Dalit feminist standpoint is not only a ‘liberatory’ feminist project but also one that is 
‘multiple, heterogenous, contradictory’, which needs to be open to and in dialogue with 
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all other liberatory projects2. In a slightly different vein, but carefully locating and 
starting from poor rural women’s ‘contradictory experiences of globalisation’ within 
transnational circuits of production and consumption, in Southern India, Priti 
Ramamurthy (2003) introduces ‘subjects in perplexity’, who ‘experience both joys and 
aches of the global everyday, often simultaneously (2003: 525). Perplexity, writes 
Ramamurthy, is the site of convergence of ‘multiple ideologies that constitute 
subjects—cultural practice, temporalities and place…’(ibid 525). Drawing on intensely 
conflictual feminist struggles in different locations in Africa, Patricia McFadden 
(2018) conceives ‘contemporarity’ as a ‘new framework for ‘black resistances’. 
‘Contemporarity’ is a critique and an alternative to neoliberal extractive capitalism and 
gendered nationalisms and envisages itself as an ‘innovative feminist  sensibility’ and 
an epistemology located in imaginaries that sustain relationships between the self, 
feminist politics and the ecological universe. Locating herself firmly in the political 
economy of knowledge production in Latin America, and critiquing statist ideologies 
of hybridity and multiculturalism deployed to manage  difference, especially,  
indigenous difference, Silvia Rivera Cusiqanqui ( 2012) writes of the notion of ‘chi’xi’, 
which is the ‘most appropriate translation of the motley mix that we, who are called 
mestizas and mestizos are’ (105). A hugely capacious ‘notion’ of many ‘connotations’, 
Chi’xi is irreducible to colonial governmentalising moves,  capturing instead the 
‘parallel coexistence of multiple cultural difference that do no extinguish but instead 
antagonise and complement each other. Each one reproduces itself from the depths of 
the past and relates to others in a contentious way’ ( 105). Crossing  South Central 
America and heading north to the border lands of Mexico and South West USA, is the 
location of  Gloria Anzaldua’s conceptual offering: borderlands. Also, the title of 
 
2 For critical interventions on Dalit feminist standpoint see Gopal Guru (1995), Datar (1999),  Lata PM  
(2015) and Arya and Rathore  2020). 
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Anzaldua’s pathbreaking book, ‘borderlands’ locates the  history of a people living in a 
specific geography; a geography spanning telling the history of the origin of Mexican 
origin US Chicanas. Straddling specific border geographies, imperial histories, 
racialised political economies of dispossession and psycho-sexual socialities, it tells 
the  history of coming into being of a ‘border culture’ and of a ‘hybrid subjectivity’  
informed and striated by histories of loss, psychic unrest, marginality, struggles to 
belong, displacement and perpetual transition. The borderland hybrid subjectivity is 
not one of a celebratory variety that confidently celebrates multi culturalism and 
diversity but is borne from an acute recognition of unequal power relations, and of 
alienation, ‘cultural ambiguity’, ‘perplexity’ But this ‘psychic unrest’, economic and 
historical alienation in the borderlands also produces an ‘alien consciousness’ --- a 
borderland consciousness, borne out of a ‘struggle of flesh, a struggle of borders, an 
inner war’… towards new possibilities’.   (100,101).  By highlighting these conceptual 
interventions, my aim is not  to provide an exhaustive list of location based concepts, 
which of course, by any means, these are not, but rather to draw attention to some of 
the conceptual work that derives from and becomes available when we start paying 
attention to a critical reflexive politics of location. What is common to these conceptual 
interventions, however, is that they go beyond the production of critique to produce 
new knowledge constructs,  and to powerfully capture the complexity of the different 
life-worlds, and by doing so, bringing these into conceptual existence. 
 
An attentiveness to a critical reflexive politics of location allows one to see clearly the 
lack of conceptual diversity and the inadequacy of conceptual repertoires for 
describing the complexity of the life worlds of subaltern rights politics in ‘most of the 
world’. And, to seek to unreflexively apply the global human rights framework to 
describe these would be to not only activate a technical application of theory but to 
	 19	
also invoke the serious charge of reproducing and authorising the epistemic and geo 
political power of the global human rights discourse by (re) telling hegemonic stories 
of power and the powerful. Impelled by the theoretical, conceptual  and ethical 
concerns  galvanised by a critical reflexive politics of location, I needed to find another 
way of entering this field of human rights without either reproducing the huge 
epistemic power and the time space provincialism of the global human rights discourse  
or compromising the complexity, dynamism, difference and epistemic and political 
struggles of human rights mobilisations in ‘most of the world’.  In effect, I had to find 
a way of forging a theoretical, empirical and conceptual path in order to engage global 
human rights in a critical, dynamic and generative way in order to bring to light new 
possibilities for imagining and expanding rights and human rights. This theoretical-
empirical-conceptual formulation, that I have forged is that of vernacular rights 
cultures. 
 
To think with vernacular rights culture is to signal an epistemic intervention into 
knowledge production from the standpoint of the marginal groups declaring and 
struggling for rights/human rights. The ‘vernacular’ here also signals that this is a 
rights politics that is linked to but significantly is not that of global human rights. 
These rights struggles are testimonial to the fact that rights/human rights are not only 
stuff of institutional and legal rights talk but that they are productive and generative; 
producing particular rights bearing subjects and also political cultures of rights. 
Viewing rights politics through the lens of vernacular rights cultures  is  to refuse 
binary rights talk of the local/global and ‘west/non west’ that characterise human 
rights discourses and to insist that rights politics in most of the world is not one that 
is simply mimetic, and engaged in the translation, enactment and localization of 
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‘global human rights’ but rather as one with its specific languages of rights and 
entitlements grounded in specific political imaginaries, justificatory premises and 
subjectivities. Key to vernacular rights cultures is that the subject of rights, is not an  
apriori person, always already given and non-gendered—but comes into being through 
particular institutional, policy, political and discursive interventions and contexts that 
are intersectionally gendered.  
 
The vernacular in vernacular rights cultures flags the different literal and conceptual 
languages of rights deployed by marginal groups in different parts of the globe. In 
order to study vernacular rights cultures in my work, I’ve taken my cue from the 
principal word signifying a right in South Asia, which is haq. The word haq is hardly 
confined to south Asia alone, of course, and is also the word for a right across the 
Middle East, Iran, Turkey and North Africa, appearing in Arabic, Urdu, Manipuri, 
Persian, Turkish and Hindustani among other languages ( Madhok 2017). For the 
better part of the last two decades, I have been relentlessly tracking the deployment of 
the haq through the deserts of Rajasthan in North western India where subaltern 
groups have mobilised to demand rights to food, public information, gender and caste 
equality, and  employment from the state, and where the indigenous peoples have 
demanded rights to sacred and ancestral forests, streams and lands. The word haq 
does not recognise national borders and formations; if anything, it undermines them. 
And, so, I’ve travelled with it further north west in the subcontinent--  from the lush 
forests of the Aravalli mountain ranges to across the  border and into the green fertile 
plains of the Punjab in Pakistan, a land  fed by South Asia’s five large rivers, where for 
the last 18 years very poor marginal peasants have taken on the great might of 
Pakistan’s military over their struggle for land ownership to emerge as most significant 
working class struggle against the military in postcolonial Pakistan .  
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The Methodological Imperative of Location 
But how does haq come into being as the principal word for a right in contemporary 
subaltern struggles in south Asia? What sorts of meanings does it acquire; how does it 
‘make up people’, aid the production of subjectivities and produce new possibilities for 
relating to oneself?  In other words, in what ways does haq enable but also constrain 
possibilities for being a (gendered) subject of rights? While I think these are not 
unreasonable questions, they do however, raise another set of questions, namely, how 
does one study these questions? Or to put it in a more stark way: what is 
methodologically involved in studying vernacular rights cultures? And, so, I am yet 
again back to the drawing board and to figure out a methodological entry point for this 
work. Through deploying a feminist historical ontology, I show how haq comes into 
being as the chief literal and conceptual term used to signify a right/human right; 
acquire meanings, ‘make up people’ (Hacking 2002), produce rights subjectivities, 
while also putting in place possibilities for becoming a (gendered) subject of rights and 
relating to oneself. Readers will discern that through assembling together a feminist 
historical ontology as a methodological device, I am both drawing on but also 
supplementing the work of the philosopher, Ian Hacking. An important element of 
Hacking’s historical ontology projects is the focus on words and concepts; of how 
concepts come into being and acquire traction at particular historical points. And, it  
is Hacking’s focus on words and concepts and their role in ‘making up people’ that 
draws me to his work on historical ontology. In part, it is also to do my  longstanding 
interest in the processes of political subjectivation, and of self-fashioning processes 
undertaken by subject through speech practices (Madhok 2013; 2018)—for instance, 
reorienting agency in terms of speech practices rather than free action, in order to 
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counter the action bias in theoretical formulations of agency—but also in trying to 
think closely about the gendered stakes and struggles involved in the  ‘politics of 
presence’ (Phillips 1993), and in the ‘performative politics of assembly’ ( Butler 2015) 
for subaltern subjects  assembling in public to stake a claim to the language of rights, 
and the ways in which  their public assembly disrupts the normative constitution of 
the public/public space while also making them ever more fragile and precarious 
subjects.  
 
However, even while I write this, I am acutely aware that Hacking is not interested in 
the coming into being of gendered concepts, nor in the gendered nature of power 
relations, imaginaries and subjectivities they put in place and nor even in the gendered 
process which ‘make up’ people.  And, even though Hacking is deeply invested in the 
particular historical sites at which words develop into concepts, he does not 
acknowledge the feminist politics of location.  And, if he did, then in thinking about 
the conceptual work of haq in South Asia, it would become evident to him, that the 
word haq is a masculine term,  and the question of gender equality needs invariably to 
be begged separately in all the citizen mobilisations I am tracking. Quite simply, this 
means that haq puts in place particular gendered political imaginaries of rights, which 
in turn, engenders a whole new arena of a  politics of struggle over haq.  
 
Gendering historical ontology, therefore, is to infuse it with an awareness of the 
inhering power relations in the meanings  that concepts take up in specific historical 
locations, and in the work they do.  Gender is an intrinsically political concept and 
struggles over gender relations are political struggles that involve an attentiveness to 
multiply intersecting and interlocking layers of conflict. A gender lens is, therefore, 
manifestly important and crucial because bringing t0 bear a  gendered perspective 
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means one is constantly aware of the intersectional and conflictual nature of rights but 
also of the limits of the normative ontological possibilities offered by haq. Accounting 
thereby, for the centrality of conflict and struggle through and within which gendered 
subjects operate and function is a key methodological imperative of feminist historical 
ontologies. So, for instance,  rights claims by very marginal gendered subjects do not 
simply involve instrumental claim making for distribution of resources. When rights 
are seized to make political claims by these gendered subjects, what is claimed in 
effect, is also a particular subjectivity and relation to the self. It for this reason that 
when gendered subjects engage in claim making, it is almost always conflictual; their 
claim making is more often than not read as oppositional to and/or disrupting of an 
established normative gender order.  
 
At this point, I imagine, that you might ask a series of questions starting with, why a 
feminist historical ontology, though? What does the coupling of ‘feminist’ with 
historical ontology bring to the methodological table?  Why must Hacking’s historical 
ontology have a ‘feminist’ prefix? Is feminist historical ontology yet another addition 
to the growing list of ‘ontological turns’ declared by an ever-increasing number of 
disciplinary formations? What does ontology mean anyway? 3 Certainly, ontology 
means different things to different people depending on who you are asking, and if the 
‘ontological turns’ declared by several academic disciplines is any indicator, then it is 
clear that ontology means a range of different things depending on the different 
disciplinary orientation. However, what is common to all these disciplinary ontological 
turns is the deep suspicion of epistemology, and consequently the drawing of a  wedge 
between epistemology and ontology, and privileging the latter over the former.  In 
 
3 See Todd (2016) on the colonial assumptions informing the ontological turn. 
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contrast with the ‘ontological turn’, a feminist historical ontology, however, refuses the 
disentanglement of epistemology from ontology. Epistemologies have particular 
ontological effects and are therefore, necessarily entangled. As the philosopher Sylvia 
Wynter has powerfully argued, our knowledge systems are explicitly organised around 
producing ‘origin stories…of who/what we are’ (Wynter in McKittrick 2015:10), and 
the ‘role of such knowledge systems’ is to elaborate the genre specific truth telling 
orders about who we are’ from the ‘no less genre specific perspective of who that we 
already are’ (ibid; 32). Making explicit connections between epistemology and 
ontology, influential black and postcolonial scholarship has called for the ‘need to 
develop feminist theory that emerges from ‘individuals who have knowledge of both 
margin and center’ (hooks xvii) and for ‘understanding marginality’ as a ‘position and 
place of resistance’ that is ‘crucial for oppressed, exploited, colonised people’ 
(1990:150-151).  The Black feminist statement released by the Combahee River 
Collective ( 1977)  established  unequivocal umbilical links between epistemology and 
ontology and announced that ‘we find our origins in the historical reality of Afro 
American women’s continuous life-and-death survival struggle for survival liberation’. 
The epistemic and political importance of ‘generating cultures of resistance’ (Hill 
Collins 1997) is also a key insistence of standpoint theorists for whom standpoint 
thinking is ‘a collective political project with both epistemological and ontological 
valences’ (Weeks 2011: 245 16n). And, partly drawing on standpoint approaches, Clare 
Hemmings (2012) argues that the mutual  relationship of epistemology and ontology 
could potentially spark off a  ‘critical dissonance’ to generate possibilities for feminist 
solidarity and transformational politics; for a politics of solidarity not  based not on 
essentialisms but on ‘affective dissonance’… ‘of also feeling the desire for 
transformation out of experience of discomfort’ ( 158) rather than on any grounds of 
shared  identity or assumed feeling. 
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A feminist historical ontology unequivocally locates itself firmly in the imbrication of 
epistemology and ontology as it works to make explicit the ways in which  concepts 
come into being in  different locations and within particular knowledge systems. It 
tracks the political imaginaries and justificatory premises, the political cultures they 
enable, the kinds of people they make up, and the politics in which they are invoked 
and sustained. The work of a feminist historical ontology begins with an insistence 
that concepts are gendered, that they are taken up and attach themselves to gendered 
bodies, and that ‘making up people’ is a gendered exercise as ‘people’ are 
intersectional subjects. By drawing attention to the different and historically specific 
and located languages of rights/human rights – both literal and conceptual in 
different parts of the globe, a feminist historical ontology attends to the political 
imaginaries these languages these make available, and to the subjectivities, forms of 
political subjectivation,  conceptions of personhood and the claims for subject status 
and gender orders they render possible. In this context, it is important to note that 
accounting for conflict and struggle is central to feminist historical ontologies 
Deploying a gender lens to historical ontology is to exercise awareness of the inhering 
power relations in the meanings that concepts take up but also in the work they do. 
Finally, ethical commitments to working to/for justice drives feminist historical 
ontologies. In particular, I want to highlight two issues in this regard: The first is to 
do with the thorny question of representation and the other is concerned with the 
relationship of marginal epistemologies to the politics of the marginalised. Driving 
both is the ethical question: how to acknowledge the intellectual contributions of the 
counterhegemonic ideological work that feminists scholars/activists do in the global 
south? And, furthermore, how to demonstrate ethical responsibility by not 
appropriating epistemologies of subaltern movements or indeed indigenous 
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mobilisations in the global south on the one hand, and/or by not displaying historical 
amnesia about their temporality, location, and counter hegemonic contributions, on 
the other hand? In other words, how to practice vigilance against an easy forgetting 
of the counter hegemonic work that is done by subaltern grassroots struggles or rights 
in the global south? These are hard questions, which must be a key focus of 
methodological investments. 
 
Practising ethical vigilance, a feminist historical ontology of haq, attends to the 
gendered saturated sites of  grassroots political struggles to document the different 
meanings of haq that are mobilised, towards what and by whom? Alongside tracking 
the forms of subjectification haq engenders and the political imaginaries it engages, a 
feminist historical ontology is attentive to the forms of rights politics and the 
erasures/silences it puts in place. It seeks to illuminate what haq allows, articulates, 
renders intelligible, refuses, and to  highlight  how the gendered articulation of 
concepts/rights exceeds both the purpose and nature of their mobilization.  In other 
words, a feminist historical ontology of haq is explicitly concerned with processes and 
discourses of subjectivation and with how gendered subjects of rights come into being 
in the vernacular.  
 
A feminist debt  
 
A critical reflexive feminist politics of location scaffolds and informs the work of  
feminist historical ontologies . As a methodological device, feminist historical 
ontologies draw on  different conceptual and theoretical interventions made by 
feminist scholars who have insisted on historical and political specificity, and have 
stipulated on  ‘naming the ground’ from where they speak. It acknowledges its debt 
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to the epistemologies that situate knowledge in multiple, interlocking and 
intersectional locations and circuits of global political economies in order to track the 
path of power that forges knowledge production in particular sites. By activating the 
question: from where are you looking and what/whom are you seeing, feminist 
historical ontologies demand to see and view all knowledges as marked knowledges, 
marked by those who inhabit particular locations and sites knowledge production. 
Finally, through insisting on locations as epistemically and politically generative 
sites,  feminist historical ontologies focus on the production of  conceptual languages 
and processes of subjectivation,  and also on  political mobilisations, in order to track 
gendered political cultures and intellectual histories of social transformation in 
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